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The diffusion of marijuana policy in the United States is a relatively new area of 
study in political science. I uncover some of the causes and methods of marijuana 
diffusion in this thesis by organizing my data from all 50 states in an Event History 
Analysis to measure what causes a state to increase its likelihood of adoption. Using 
fiscal health of the state, ideological position in the government and in the citizenry, 
partisan control of a state, and amount of surrounding state with a pro-marijuana 
policy, I examine how these variables affect each state’s likelihood to adopt. With a 
series of Cox Proportional Hazards models, I determine (1) that states generally adopt 
pro-marijuana policies when they are in a good fiscal situation, (2) more liberal and 
Democratic states are more likely to adopt a pro-marijuana policy, and (3) 
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As final ballots were tallied across America in 1996, few major domestic policy shifts 
were projected from the election season. President Clinton was slated for a second term, and 
the Republican Congress had already passed many of the items on its lengthy legislative 
agenda. However, for one state, the 1996 election season was one that would go down in 
history. Voters in California were going to the polls to vote on Proposition 215, known as the 
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (California General Assembly 1996. Prop 215, S.B. 420). 
With 56% voting in favor of the initiative, California became the first state in America to 
legalize Cannabis for medical use. This event also marked the beginning of a slow decline in 
America’s “War on Drugs” that had started in the Nixon Administration and was perpetuated 
by the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations. Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Maine, and 
others soon followed with their own medical marijuana programs, and many would 
eventually move into full recreational legalization. These pro-marijuana reforms spread 
relatively quickly given the tough anti-marijuana stance that most politicians had taken prior 
to 1996. 	
There are many reasons that a state might liberalize marijuana policies. The recently 
discovered medical benefits of cannabis have been one of the biggest arguments from 
marijuana legalization supporters, and many medical marijuana patients suffering from 
chronic pain, insomnia, and anxiety have attested to the effectiveness of cannabis (Webb and 
Webb 2014). Many states seeking to liberalize their marijuana laws have framed it as a 
medical issue, often adding words like “care” and “compassion” in marijuana bills to shift 
the focus away from legalizing a drug and placing the emphasis on medicine. Additionally, 
the previous dogma that marijuana is a so-called “gateway drug” has been largely disproved 
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by the medical field (Tarter et al. 2006). The gateway hypothesis was a common thread 
among anti-legalization efforts, and disproving this hypothesis gave states one more reason 
to consider reforming their marijuana laws. States have also been known to look towards 
revenue-generating programs such as marijuana when times get tough. Liberalizing 
marijuana laws and taxing the product sold in a legal market would surely help replenish the 
state treasury coffers in an economic recession or an important election year.	
Today, 11 states have full recreational legalization, 34 have a medical marijuana 
program, and 25 have decriminalized marijuana.1 Public opinion appears to endorse these 
policies, as support for legalization has steadily increased since the 1970s (Figure 1). There’s 
certainly an appetite for changing marijuana policies among the public, but this does not 
explain the mechanics of state marijuana policy adoption. This thesis examines how, and 
why, pro-marijuana policies have spread so rapidly. Through statistical analysis, I examine 
internal characteristics of states, as well as outside factors that increase the likelihood that a 
state will adopt pro-marijuana policies. This is known as the study of policy diffusion.	
Since De Tarde’s Laws of Imitation (1903), policy diffusion has played an essential 
role in political science literature. Diffusion scholarship, especially the recent rise of 
quantitative methods in diffusion research, has provided actors with valuable data that can be 
utilized in the policymaking process. My findings on how marijuana policy spreads 
throughout the states could potentially aid lawmakers and outside actors in determining the 
best climate to push an initiative or bring legislation to the floor. From here, I will review the 
literature on marijuana policies and diffusion research, examine my data through a series of 





findings as they pertain to this topical area and in regards to what we know about the ways 






















Perhaps the most unique attribute of marijuana policy is its illegal federal status. 
Other diffusion scholarship has focused on legal policy changes such as adoption of lotteries 
and taxes or tax breaks. These are important policies to consider, but few diffusion studies 
have examined how federally illegal policies spread through states. Marijuana is a unique 
policy area that deserves further study, and it is important that the factors affecting different 
levels of legalization are made clear to all stakeholders involved.  Here I discuss how 
marijuana policy spreads, methods in which to quantify it, and where political scientists 
could further pursue the study of marijuana policy.	
 Congress has classified marijuana as a “Schedule 1 Drug,” meaning that it has no 
medical benefits and a high potential for abuse (O’Keefe 2013). Therefore, marijuana policy 
must be examined within the broader scope of resistance to federal mandates. When a state 
decides not to follow federal guidelines or refuses federal orders, it is resisting federal 
mandates, which creates a power struggle that is generally solved by the judicial branch. 
Much work has been done in this area of political science, such as the research on resistance 
to No Child Left Behind (Shelley 2012), the Affordable Care Act (Balla and Deering 2015), 
and a standardized federal identification, or “REAL ID” (Regan and Deering 2009). 
However, marijuana policy is different in that states are legalizing what the federal 
government deems explicitly illegal. Since Gonzales v. Raich (2005) established the right of 
the federal government to regulate cannabis under the Commerce Clause, federal DEA and 
FBI agents have become the final arbiters in situations that were traditionally dealt with by 
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the judicial branch. This would lead us to believe that the depth of federal government 
enforcement would have an impact on state adoption, but interestingly enough, Hannah and 
Mallinson (2018) find that there is no statistical correlation between state marijuana policy 
adoption, and liberal vs. conservative presidential administrations (or explicit DEA signals 
regarding marijuana). So, marijuana policy does not seem to spread from the top-down or 
bottom-up; the federal government hasn’t affected state’s decisions (though that would 
probably change with a federal reclassification of marijuana), and it does not seem likely that 
states will pressure the Justice Department to reclassify marijuana anytime soon. Looking at 
individual state characteristics will provide us with a better understanding on how these 
policies diffuse.	
In a comprehensive Event History Analysis on medical marijuana diffusion, Bradford 
and Bradford (2017) give us a detailed account of factors affecting the spread of marijuana 
policy. Their data show that neighboring states adopting legalization do indeed put the states 
around them more at risk for adoption, but this is somewhat counterbalanced by the fact that 
ideological distance between states increases with legalization (in other words, a Democratic 
state and a Republican state will become ideologically further apart after one state legalizes). 
This will in turn reduce the likelihood of legalization from the neighboring state. Not 
surprisingly, the analysis also indicated that ideology of the mean voter (more liberal) as well 
as the average income (higher incomes) in each state increases the likelihood of legalization. 
Hannah and Mallinson (2018) note that outside actors play a crucial role in marijuana policy, 
something that an EHA has been known to leave out. In their study, the authors find that 
“ecological capacity” impacts the adoption of marijuana policy, meaning that variables such 
as legislative professionalism and the availability of the ballot initiative increase the 
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likelihood of adoption. These initiative campaigns are generally spearheaded by outside 
groups such as the National Association for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and 
the Marijuana Policy Project (MPP) via monetary donations and petition collection. 
Conversely, their analysis finds that the number of self-proclaimed “evangelicals” in a state 
contributes significantly to keeping marijuana legalization off the table in the first place, 
which is consistent with Haider-Markel’s (2001) and Berry and Berry’s (1990) research 
regarding opponents keeping issues off the agenda. Finally, Kim (2016) finds that among 
other factors already presented here, poor state fiscal health and higher levels of incarceration 
also increase the likelihood of marijuana legalization, suggesting that states potentially 
choose legalization to increase state revenue. 	
 Based on the data scholars have collected thus far, political scientists can make the 
cautious assumption that marijuana legalization and the policies that follow are generally 
explained by individual state characteristics, rather than by geographical proximity or top-
down diffusion (Hannah and Mallinson 2018). State specific factors, such as the availability 
of direct democracy, presence of evangelicals, and overall fiscal health determine a state’s 
marijuana policy along with presence of policy entrepreneurs and other outside actors. I have 
noted that scholars must make the aforementioned assumption somewhat cautiously for two 
reasons. The first is that we simply don’t have a large amount of time from which to collect 
data, since California was the first to adopt in 1996. It could be that initial diffusion of 
medical marijuana policy will differ from its diffusion 20 or 30 years in the future, or that 
actors and public attitudes will change once the “newness” of marijuana legalization wears 
off. The second reason is that all the studies mentioned in this section have been on medical 
marijuana specifically. Since Colorado became the first state to legalize recreational 
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marijuana in 2012, these policies have not been around long enough to warrant much 
research. The literature on recreational marijuana is almost exclusively confined to criminal 
justice (Dragone et al. 2019, Stufano 2018) and public health (Aydelotte et al. 2019, Shi et al. 
2019). As more states legalize marijuana, more comparisons can be made between states, and 
more confident conclusions can be reached. The next section examines diffusion research 
more broadly, and how diffusion scholarship coincides with my analysis of state marijuana 
policy. 	
	
Horizontal vs. Vertical Diffusion	
 There are two ways that policies diffuse across jurisdictions in America: through a 
vertical (top-down) model or a horizontal (between states) model (Berry and Berry 2018). In 
a vertical approach, the federal government can force, coerce, or incentivize states and local 
governments to adopt a policy. Often, this is through Supreme Court mandates, executive 
orders, or laws passed in Congress. Examples of vertical diffusion include the 2015 ruling on 
same sex marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges 2015), President Reagan’s Executive Order 
requiring a cost-benefit analysis on regulations (Executive Order 12292), and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 preventing states from implementing things like literacy tests. Following 
the Obergefell decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the 14th amendment compels all 50 
states to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples, resulting in a remarkably 
rapid diffusion from the Judiciary to the states. President Reagan’s executive order initiated 
top-down diffusion in an administrative setting, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 showed 
how the legislative branch can similarly enact rapid vertical diffusion. However, in Shelby 
County v. Holder (2013), the Supreme Court eliminated a preclearance provision in Section 5 
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of the VRA, freeing up states to make changes to their voting system without clearing it with 
the federal government and reversing much of the VRA’s original intent. 	
Diffusion can also occur in the opposite direction, where policies develop at the state 
and local level and move upward to the federal level through public pressure or coercion. 
Examples of this bottom-up diffusion can be found in many of the provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act that originated in Massachusetts’ 2006 health care bill (Beland, 
Medrano, and Rocco 2018), as well as anti-smoking policies which originated in US cities 
and were eventually adopted by the federal government (Shipan and Volden 2006). In each 
of these cases, a policy originated at some level of government and was copied by another 
part of that government. This is the essence of vertical policy diffusion.	
Horizontal diffusion is generally studied more often in American political science due 
to the high priority of federalism in our government structure (Shipan and Volden 2006). 
Horizontal diffusion is more easily achieved in federalism than in other types of government, 
as there are generally enough separate lawmaking bodies with similar characteristics to 
facilitate the spread of policy. Unitary governments also have separate lawmaking bodies, but 
are more tightly bound by the federal government, making horizontal diffusion difficult. On 
the other hand, confederal forms of government do not bind the independent lawmaking 
bodies together enough to allow much systematic policy diffusion. In a horizontal diffusion 
model, there are several ways that policies can diffuse to states, but the two prominent 
methods are regional diffusion and internal determinants (Berry and Berry 1990). Typically, 
both methods come into play when policies diffuse, and there can be issues with testing 
whether a policy has diffused regionally or internally. Berry and Berry (2018) note that it can 
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be difficult to empirically separate the two, given that bordering states potentially have 
similar internal circumstances.	
	
Regional Diffusion vs. Internal Determinants	
Regional diffusion theory claims that states are most likely to emulate policies from 
neighboring states (Walker 1969), and policy adoption can best be studied by observing 
states that border each other (Berry and Berry 2018). Within regional diffusion, there are 
three basic models that are the focus of political science literature: the neighbor model, the 
leader-laggard model (may be regional or internal), and the national interaction model (also 
known as the organizational diffusion model). The neighbor model is the idea that states 
which border each other are more likely to adopt the policies of their neighbors. Berry and 
Berry (1990) present evidence that the adoption of state lottery systems is, at least partially, 
an example of the neighbor model of diffusion. In the leader-laggard model, states tend to 
“learn” from other states (not necessarily from those that border them) and some states are 
more innovative than others. Jack Walker (1969) first proposed this model of diffusion in one 
of the earliest and most comprehensive articles in the literature. Walker proposed a sort of 
tree-like diagram with “leaders” at the top, mid-range innovators in the middle, and low-level 
“laggards” at the bottom. His analysis concluded that states like New York and California are 
most likely to innovate due to their professional legislatures, large urban populations, and 
higher income levels per capita (Grupp and Richards 1975). At the bottom of the “innovation 
tree” were states such as Mississippi and South Carolina, which tend to spend less time 
making laws, and have less dense urban populations. Gray’s (1973) work on innovation adds 
that states may lead in certain settings, while lagging in others. Oil rich states such as Texas, 
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North Dakota, and Wyoming have led the nation in innovating oil and gas policies like 
fracking and offshore drilling, despite failing to innovate in many other policy areas.	
Finally, the national interaction model is based on the concept that lawmakers and 
other policy entrepreneurs will interact with each other in various conferences, organizations, 
and think tanks. As policy adoption grows, these actors gain influence, causing others they 
interact with to also adopt a given innovation (Rogers 1995, Walker 1969), and these 
interactions will result in policies diffusing across states (Gray 1973). Non-partisan groups 
may facilitate national interaction, such as the National Conference for State Legislatures, the 
National Governors Association, and the United States Conference of Mayors. There are also 
varying degrees of partisanship among some interaction facilitators, such as the Republican 
dominated American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Democrat dominated 
State Innovation Exchange (SIX). Policies are often created through national interaction in 
several different areas including higher education, which was led by Complete College 
America and various gubernatorial organizations (Gandara, Ness, and Rippner 2017), and 
same sex marriage bans, led by the Family Research Council and other religious actors 
(Haider-Markel 2001). There are also situations where government agencies can facilitate 
policy diffusion themselves, rather than accept policy diffusion from the outside. 
Stoutenborough and Beverlin’s (2008) study of net metering policy is a great example of 
agency-facilitated policy diffusion. In this instance, various EPA offices around the country 
encouraged power customers to switch to “net metering,” where customers may generate 
their own electricity and sell it back to the electricity company at market rate. This program 
grew as solar power became more affordable, and is now commonplace in many states, thus 
creating a prime example of horizontal policy diffusion by a government agency.	
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 Horizontal diffusion also encompasses the “internal determinants” model, or the idea 
that state internal factors can explain policy adoptions. Berry and Berry note that the internal 
determinants model presumes that “political, economic, and social characteristics internal to 
the jurisdiction” are the primary factors causing a government to adopt a new policy (2018 p. 
308). Of course, policies almost never appear out of thin air; the internal determinants model 
assumes that knowledge of policies from other jurisdictions is a prerequisite for diffusion, but 
internal factors predict the likelihood that policy is adopted, rather than simply learning and 
implementing from other states (Rogers 1995). The literature shows many factors go into the 
likelihood of a state to adopt, and the factors vary depending on the policy. Walker (1969) 
was the first to note that wealthier and more urban states are more likely to innovate, while 
later research further isolated these factors. Returning to Berry and Berry’s (1990) study of 
lottery adoption, they found that fiscal health, election years, personal income, and 
percentage of religious fundamentalists in the population all played a role in whether the state 
would adopt. Similar determinants explain other economic policies, such as the adoption of 
income and sales taxes (Berry and Berry 1992). 	
 Other factors influencing policy innovation include education level (Rogers 1995 ch. 
7), professional nature of policy makers (Walker 1969, discussed in the “leader-laggard 
section”), and availability of “slack resources” (Cyert and March 1963). Lawrence Mohr 
(1969) synthesized these factors into one theory, suggesting that innovations are the product 
of motivation, overcoming obstacles to innovation, and availability of resources. 	
Finally, Berry and Berry (2018) add that there are five ways in which policies are 
generally diffused: learning, imitation, normative pressure, competition, and coercion. These 
techniques can be used in horizontal or vertical diffusion, such as the federal government 
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putting normative pressure on states to adopt a 0.08 BAC level on drivers by showing that 
fatalities occur at a higher rate when a driver is over that limit. The federal government also 
coerced states into adopting the 0.08 limit by withholding federal highway funds. 	
Political scientists have come up with many methods for isolating and testing various 
factors to determine what policies diffuse when and why. I now turn to some of the 
prominent methods that have been used in the diffusion literature.	
	
Methodological Differences in Diffusion Research 	
 Policy diffusion research has its beginnings in qualitative research of agriculture and 
other rural practices (see Ryan and Gross’s (1950) study of hybrid corn seed adoption), and 
over time has followed the same trend as American political research toward more 
quantitative work. Therefore, it only makes sense to start with qualitative methods. Starke 
(2013) notes that there are three primary qualitative methods that scholars use in diffusion 
research: cross-case analysis, within-case process tracing, and counterfactual reasoning. 	
Cross-case analysis is generally an exercise in comparing a few non-random cases 
that share similar circumstances in order to assess competing explanatory claims (Mahoney 
1999). Cross-case analyses are normally paired with other methods due to the somewhat 
basic bivariate correlations that are generally a result of this method. Process tracing is more 
interested in discerning a point in the process that causes an outcome (in this case, when a 
policy is adopted) (George and Bennett 2005). Van Evera (1997) refers to this as a “smoking 
gun” linking one or several independent variables with the outcome. An example of this is a 
bill that is copied and pasted verbatim from another source including errors made in the 
original bill (Sharman 2010). These types of “model bills” are a favorite of advocacy groups 
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like ALEC that seek to make horizontal diffusion easier. Finally, there is counterfactual 
reasoning, which is one of the more controversial methods in diffusion research. This method 
is primarily a thought experiment, or a “theory-guided reasoning about what might have 
been” (Starke 2013 p. 575). Andrew Karch (2007a) implicitly uses this method when 
studying three very different states that introduced bills almost simultaneously. In Karch’s 
analysis, Virginia, Oregon, and Massachusetts implemented various welfare reforms (time 
limits, family caps, and Individual Savings Accounts) and new healthcare policies (Medical 
Savings Accounts and senior prescription drug programs) between 1994 and 2001. Karch 
uses counterfactual reasoning to look back at this policy climate and understand why states 
with different demographics and political cultures adopted similar policies in the same 
period.	
 Quantitative methods in policy diffusion research have become increasing popular as 
technology has improved, which has added another layer to the literature. Since Berry and 
Berry’s (1990) analysis of state lotteries using an Event History Analysis (EHA), this method 
has been the primary way in which diffusion scholars have measured policy adoption in 
American politics. The Event History Analysis allows researchers to show which variables 
cause a state to be “at risk” for adoption, and how the variables interact with each other. 
Since the first use of quantitative methods in policy diffusion, scholars have examined 
variables such as availability of resources (Tweedie 1994) and severity of problem (Daley 
and Garand 2005) to show diffusion of climate change adaptation (Miao 2019) and sex 
offender laws (Easterly 2015), to name a few. The EHA has encouraged “comparability 
across studies” (Karch 2007b) and done much for defining characteristics that put a state at 
risk for adoption. However, this method can leave out the role of policy entrepreneurs and 
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transnational networks- a piece of the puzzle that is critical in American politics (see 
Mintrom’s work on policy entrepreneurs in school choice (2000), stem cell research (2013), 
and climate change (Mintrom and Luetjens 2017)).	
 To account for these other factors, diffusion scholars have looked to other types of 
models. Regression models have been used to explain adoption of things like sanctuary city 
policies (Collingwood et al. 2018) and education reform (Finger 2018). Others have 
incorporated the Geographic Information System (GIS) into their models, allowing for a 
closer examination of distance between specific populations and its effect on diffusion (Berry 
and Baybeck 2005, Mitchell 2018). In a slightly simpler form of statistical analysis, Walker’s 
“Innovation Scores” (1969) used averages and a factor analysis to provide strong evidence 
for the “leader-laggard” model discussed earlier, proving that more complex quantitative 
methods do not necessarily correlate to deeper knowledge. There has recently been evidence 
that bordering states with a policy will decrease the likelihood that a state will adopt said 
policy, or a “reverse policy diffusion” effect. Li’s (2017) work on performance-based 
funding for public schools demonstrated that states may be less inclined to adopt this method 
of funding if they border states that have adopted the method. These adoption delays are due 
in part to states preferring to see how a policy is playing out in other areas before deciding to 
adopt. While it is unclear if this is generalizable to other areas of policy diffusion, this is 









Though pro-marijuana policies take many forms and have many different 
motivations, for the purposes of my analysis, I categorize them as follows: Illegal, 
Decriminalized, Medical, and Recreational. A state that has decriminalized marijuana has 
either (a) changed the penalty from criminal to civil or (b) changed the penalty from jail time 
to a fine. Each state that has passed a decriminalization bill meets these criteria, though 
possession amount and penalties vary. In my models, this category is a time series analysis of 
all 50 states starting one year before the first case of decriminalization (Oregon in 1973). 
Therefore, the time series runs from 1972 to 2020, and each state that decriminalizes 
marijuana drops out of the model at the year of adoption.	
A state in the medical category has passed into law a medical marijuana program of 
any size or type. These states may or may not have licensed dispensaries, and they may allow 
marijuana to be prescribed for as few or as many diseases as they see fit. If there is a medical 
marijuana program at all, regardless of size, the state is included in this category. For my 
purposes, this category is a time series analysis of all 50 states from 1995 (one year before 
California first adopts medical marijuana) to 2020, with a state dropping out of the model on 
the year it legalizes a medical program.	
Finally, the recreational category contains all states that have passed recreational 
marijuana into law. This category is the easiest to identify; if the state allows dispensaries to 
sell marijuana or allows marijuana to be legally grown by ordinary citizens, it is in the 
recreational category. The recreational category is a time series analysis of all 50 states 
starting in 2011, or one year before the first adoption (Colorado and Washington in 2012) 
and going through 2020. 	
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These categories will help in determining which independent variables affect each 
type of marijuana policy. It is also important to note that states do not necessarily have to 
belong to only one category. States may have one or two policies, but not all three, such as 
West Virginia which has a medical program but has not decriminalized marijuana for 
ordinary citizens. Data regarding the year of adoption for each category were obtained from 
ballotpedia.org, a nonpartisan online encyclopedia of legislation and election results. Other 
scholars have used ballotpedia.org in their scholarship (Downie 2016, Wardle 2012), 
suggesting that it is a reliable source of information. Now that each policy category is made 


















 In this analysis, I look at factors affecting the legalization and decriminalization of 
marijuana in the American states. The study of marijuana is still in nascent stages due to the 
relatively recent implementation of medical and recreational legalization. Political scientists 
have only recently begun the long journey of applying methods used in other policy diffusion 
studies to the diffusion and adoption of marijuana policy, and I hope to add to their work 
with my broad analysis of three primary marijuana policies.	
 My research design examines adoption of marijuana policy using quantitative 
methods. While a qualitative analysis is beneficial to individual cases of marijuana policy 
adoption, in this study, I frame the issue at a macro level, meaning that I try to capture the 
factors contributing to adoption of marijuana policy in the aggregate. The best way to capture 
this is by using a quantitative analysis; this captures larger systemic factors as opposed to 
individual outcomes (Kuehn and Rohlfing 2016). As noted in the literature review, Berry and 
Berry (1990; 1992) are pioneers of the EHA, and many have adopted this as the preferred 
method for studying policy diffusion of everything from living will laws (Glick and Hays 
1991) to school choice policies (Mintrom 1997). Given the successful use of this model by 
other diffusion scholars and the similarity between marijuana adoption and other policy 
adoptions studied, the EHA is appropriate for studying marijuana policy diffusion and should 
yield useful results.	
 Before the EHA became widely available to diffusion scholars, most of the literature 
consisted of various types of cross-sectional analyses that used state and local characteristics 
as the independent variables, while the dependent variable was either the year a policy was 
adopted (Gray 1973, Walker 1969) or whether a policy had been adopted by a certain point 
 
 18 
in time (Regens 1980). These studies are useful, but they generally do not explain causes of 
diffusion when adoption is years, or even decades apart (Berry and Berry 1990). It is also not 
possible to determine the effect of “time sensitive” variables, such as the likelihood of 
adoption in an election year, or just after an election. The EHA allows us to see the 
likelihood that a state will be at risk for adoption by isolating different characteristics.	
 Another benefit of the EHA is that it can combine an analysis of internal determinant 
variables (such as ideological makeup and fiscal health of the state) with regional variables 
such as the presence of the policy in neighboring states. Using internal characteristics and 
presence of policy in neighboring states as the independent variable, and the likelihood of 
adoption as the dependent variable allows me to combine regional diffusion analysis and 
internal characteristic analysis into one model. This is precisely the purpose of EHA, and it is 
no surprise that it is the preferred method of analysis for diffusion scholars today.	
 This EHA model will use the likelihood that a state will adopt a policy as the 
dependent variable, and the internal determinants of the state (discussed below) along with 
neighboring state influence as the independent variables. In this way, I can isolate each 
internal characteristic of a state and its relationship to the three marijuana policy categories. 




 When studying marijuana policy, there is much to be gleaned from the broader 
diffusion literature regarding economic factors that affect policy adoptions. One of those 
factors is tax revenue, which Stanley (2019) has shown to be a determinant when deciding to 
adopt marijuana policy. Therefore, Berry and Berry’s (1992) economic independent variables 
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used in their study of sales and income tax adoption are also useful in studying other revenue 
generating policies, such as marijuana legalization. States that have struggling economies 
turn to policies more popular than a simple increase in income or sales taxes, therefore:	
HYPOTHESIS 1: Lower GSP per capita will increase the risk of adopting medical or 
recreational marijuana policies.	
HYPOTHESIS 2: Lower personal income per capita will increase the risk of adopting 
medical or recreational marijuana policies.	
Ideological and partisan differences will naturally come into play when examining an 
issue as contentious as marijuana. It has long been assumed that more heavily Democratic 
states will be more prone to pro marijuana policy adoption, though there is limited research 
when it comes to this assertion. Most of the association between Democrats and marijuana 
policy has come from pop-culture references and the fact that a very liberal state was the first 
to adopt medical marijuana policy and open dispensaries to the public (California). As it 
relates to ideology, I have two hypotheses to test in my analysis:	
HYPOTHESIS 3: The more liberal a state’s citizenry is, the more likely it is to adopt pro- 
marijuana policy.	
HYPOTHESIS 4: The more liberal a state’s government is, the more likely it is to adopt pro-
marijuana policy.	
Since the ideological position of a state and partisan position of a state may not 
always coincide (think of the southern party realignment), I have also included a measure of 
state government partisan control and a corresponding hypothesis.	
HYPOTHESIS 5: An increase in Democratic control of a state government will increase the 
risk of pro-marijuana policy adoption.	
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 When looking at a map of marijuana laws in the United States, one could observe a 
stronger “neighbor effect” in recreational adoption than in medical or decriminalization. All 
west coast states and Nevada have recreational legalization, Colorado, Michigan, and Illinois 
are standalones, and there is a cluster of states in the northeast. It is certainly possible that the 
likelihood of recreational or medical adoption will increase if one or more states surrounding 
it also have recreational or medical marijuana. 	
HYPOTHESIS 6: States with a greater number of bordering states with pro-marijuana 
policies will have a higher risk of adoption than states with fewer bordering states with pro-
marijuana policies.	
 The use of these economic, regional, and ideological variables provide a 
comprehensive overview of what drives a state to “innovate,” or adopt marijuana policy, as 
well as potential obstacles to legalization. Successful testing of these hypotheses could be 
used to potentially predict where and how future policy adoptions will occur; information 
that will be useful to lawmakers and advocates alike.	
	
Independent Variables	
To capture the relationship between a state’s fiscal health and its likelihood to adopt, I 
have developed two economic variables for this analysis: (1) Gross state product per capita 
(gsppercapitai,t-1) and (2) Average personal income per capita (personalincomepercapitai,t-1) 
which will be used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. The GSP per capita variable is 
calculated by taking the overall gross state product for each state in a given year, and 
dividing it by the mid-year population count, as reported by the census. Similarly, the 
personal income per capita variable is calculated by taking the average personal income for 
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each state in a given year and dividing it by the mid-year population. GSP and personal 
income data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.	
As for the relationship between pro-marijuana policy adoption and ideology, I have 
included two variables in my analysis: a citizen ideology variable (citizenideologyscores,t-1) 
and a government ideology variable (governmentideologyscores,t-1) which will be used to test 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, respectively. The citizen ideology score is designed to indirectly capture 
public opinion while the government ideology score is designed to capture the political 
climate of a state’s government. For these two variables, I use a score developed by Berry et 
al. (1998) for each state and each year in the dataset. The full list of inputs can be found in 
the Berry et al. (1998) article, but they include things like interest group ratings of 
Congressional members and election returns. The various factors are combined into a 
singular score with lower scores indicating a more conservative citizenry or government, and 
higher scores indicating more liberal. These scores used as independent variables in this 
analysis will hopefully return a definitive answer as to whether the ideological position of a 
state influences the likelihood of marijuana policy adoption.2	
To measure state party control, I use a Ranney Partisan Control Index (ranneyindexi,t-1) 
which is used to test Hypothesis 5. Like the ideology scores mentioned above, the Ranney 
Index consists of many factors including which party controls state offices and the 
legislature, and by what margin. This index ranges from 0 to 1, where total Republican 
control is coded as 0, and total Democrat control is coded as 1 (Klarner 2013). This index 
further sheds light on the association between party, ideology, and likelihood of marijuana 
policy adoption.3	
 
2  These data are available at https://rcfording.com/state-ideology-data/ 
3 These data are available at https://www.klarnerpolitics.org/datasets-1 
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Finally, I account for the “neighbor effect” with the variable (neighborsi,t) which is 
used to test Hypothesis 6. This variable is simply the number of states that surround a given 
state at each point in time. For instance, Idaho had two neighboring states with 
decriminalization in 2001, so it was coded 2 for this variable until 2012, when it had three 
neighboring states with decriminalization. From 2012 forward, the neighboring state variable 





















 As previously mentioned, states are classified in the following categories: Illegal, 
decriminalized, legal for medical use, or legal for recreational use. In a state where cannabis 
is totally illegal, those found to be in possession will be arrested and taken to a holding 
facility for a period of time. Currently there are eight states that fall into this category, but it 
is important to note that a state can have a medical marijuana program in place while still 
jailing those in possession without a medical license (Arizona, Utah, and Montana are 
examples of this and do not fall into the illegal category). Additionally, these “illegal” states 
will vary in their aggressiveness in enforcing the laws on marijuana; states are put into these 
categories based on their statutes and not on the degree of enforcement. States in the “illegal” 
category will not be included in my analysis, as the absence of a policy cannot be studied in 
this context. Table 1 summarizes the status of each state’s marijuana policies. 	
The decriminalized category encompasses 25 states, some of which may come as a 
surprise. A few of the most traditionally conservative states were pioneers in decriminalizing 
marijuana in the mid-1970s. Mississippi, North Carolina, Alaska, and Nebraska all led the 
effort to decriminalize, while more traditionally, pro-cannabis states like Washington and 
Nevada did not manage to pass decriminalization until the 2000s. A report from the 1972 
Schafer Commission describing the relatively benign nature of cannabis is likely the reason 
behind the wave of decriminalization in the 1970s (Schafer Library of Drug Policy 1972). 
This report found that the federal government had overplayed the harmful effects of cannabis 
and the “tough-on-crime” approach taken by the federal government had been costly and 
ineffective. Figure 2 shows that a handful of states used this report to justify 
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decriminalization in the 1970s, though the anti-drug countermovement that followed ensured 
decriminalization would be halted until the early 2000s.	
 




 The medical category is the largest category in the dataset with 34 states in the union 
operating some sort of medical marijuana market (shown in Figure 3). The eight states with 
medical programs and no decriminalization emphasize the somewhat odd and contradictory 
way that states have approached cannabis. There is by no means a linear movement from 
complete illegality to full recreational legalization, meaning that states may not adopt pro-
marijuana policy in order of their liberalizing nature (decriminalization to medical use to 
recreational use). States can move between these categories in what can be a somewhat 











 Finally, Figure 4 shows that the recreational category is the smallest with 11 states 
boasting a fully legal marijuana market for anyone over 21. As in all the categories, these 
states differ on many facets of the policy such as the maximum amount one can purchase and 
possess, what is considered an open-container, and how purchases are made. In my analysis, 
I am only interested in whether the law has been enacted or not in each state, rather than 
variation within each of these categories. 	
Figure 4 - Recreational Marijuana in the US	
 
Data from ballotpedia.org 
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Table 1 - Marijuana Policies by State	
ILLEGAL DECRIMINALIZED MEDICAL RECREATIONAL 
ALABAMA ALASKA ALASKA ALASKA 
IDAHO CALIFORNIA ARIZONA CALIFORNIA 
KANSAS COLORADO ARKANSAS COLORADO 
SOUTH CAROLINA CONNECTICUT CALIFORNIA ILLINOIS 
SOUTH DAKOTA DELAWARE COLORADO MAINE 
TENNESSEE HAWAII CONNECTICUT MASSACHUSETTS 
WISCONSIN ILLINOIS DELAWARE MICHIGAN 
WYOMING MAINE FLORIDA NEVADA  
MARYLAND HAWAII OREGON  
MASSACHUSETTS ILLINOIS VERMONT  











NEVADA MINNESOTA  
NEW HAMPSHIRE MISSOURI 
 
 
NEW MEXICO MONTANA 
 
 
NEW YORK NEVADA 
 
 
NORTH CAROLINA NEW HAMPSHIRE  
OHIO NEW JERSEY  
OREGON NEW MEXICO  
VERMONT NEW YORK 
 
 










PENNSYLVANIA   







WASHINGTON   
WEST VIRGINIA    
  






 One thing to note from the information above that I have not included in my analysis 
is the priming effect observed from a medical program to recreational legalization. In every 
case of recreational legalization, the state already had a medical marijuana program in place. 
Put another way, no state has jumped from decriminalization to recreational, or from illegal 
to recreational. Though I have only 11 states to observe, it seems that states must be 
introduced to marijuana through a medical program before moving to full recreational 
legalization. Perhaps distribution mechanisms must already be in place from a medical 
market (grow houses, dispensaries, transportation companies) before the shock of 
recreational legalization can be absorbed by a state. With this information in mind, I can now 
















Comparing Adopters and Non-Adopters	
In the tables below, I compare independent variable means in adopting states with 
non-adopting states across the three marijuana policy categories.4 The rows of each table list 
independent variables used in the analysis. Columns one and two separate adopters and non-
adopters, while columns three and four report the t-score and p-value for each test.5 Column 
one displays the mean of each independent variable for states that have adopted the 
marijuana policy and column two displays the mean of each independent variable for states 
that have not adopted the marijuana policy. All tables have the same difference of means test, 
but a different policy category is examined in each. For example, Table 2 compares means of 
the 34 states at their year of medical adoption (“Adopters” column) with all years from non-
adopters. There are 34 data points from which to calculate the mean of adopters (one data 
point at the year of adoption for each state with a medical program), while there are 910 data 
points from which to calculate the mean of non-adopters (all data points that don’t coincide 
with an adoption year). An adopting state is considered a non-adopter until the year of 
adoption. The format is identical for Tables 3 and 4.	
 Table 2 provides the results of a means comparison between adopters and non-
adopters of medical marijuana. The financial variables provide evidence rejecting 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, as adopters have a higher average GSP and personal income per capita 
than non-adopters with significant p-values. Though the difference is small in the GSP per 
capita variable, personal income per capita shows an almost $7,000 difference between 
adopters and non-adopters (p-value= 0.001). Moving to the ideology variables, the results 
 
4 Note: All results have been rounded to the hundredth decimal place, except GSP and personal income per 
capita, which have been left in-tact to show the relationship between those variables and the likelihood of 
adoption.  
5 All p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
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show higher scores among adopters in both the citizen and government ideology variables 
(though only citizen ideology reaches significance at p-value= 0.03). Since higher scores 
connotate a higher level of liberalness, this confirms that more liberal states are more likely 
to adopt pro-marijuana policy, and thus confirming Hypothesis 3. The Ranney Index variable 
similarly shows that adopters have a higher (more Democratic) mean than non-adopters, but 
it is not statistically significant (p-value= 0.21). As expected, the neighbors variable reports 
that adopters on average have a higher number of states surrounding them with a medical 
marijuana program compared to non-adopters (1.47 states compared to 0.67 states, p-value= 
0.001).	





GSP per capita 48964.24 46185.46 -1.74 *0.08 
Personal income per 
capita 
41282.15 34618.79 -4.02 **0.001 
Citizen ideology 52.29 46.7 -2.2 *0.03 
Government ideology 46.11 42.15 -1.49 0.14 
Ranney index 0.49 0.45 -1.24 0.21 
Neighbors 1.47 0.67 -4.16 **0.001 
     
   *p-value< 0.1  
   **p-value< 0.01  
	
Table 3 reports the results of a means comparison between adopters and non-adopters 
in the recreational category. The differences are similar to the results reported in Table 2, but 
the means for adopters and non-adopters are higher, perhaps due to the more constrained 
time series used in the recreational category (first states adopt in 2012). Financial variables 
yield results that once again reject Hypotheses 1 and 2, as adopters appear to have higher 
average GSP and personal income per capita compared to non-adopters. However, 
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significance is only reached in the personal income variable (p-value= 0.09), leading me to 
only reject Hypothesis 2 in this comparison. Mean differences among the two ideology 
variables in this test show a large 11-point gap between adopters and non-adopters, and with 
a significant p-value on each (p-value= 0.01), I can confidently assert that these comparison 
results are not by chance. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are confirmed in the recreational category. 
Unlike in the medical category, the Ranney Index variable reaches significance (p-value= 
0.06) and shows a difference of 0.10 between adopters and non-adopters. This suggests that 
heavily Democratic states are more likely to adopt pro-marijuana policy than split or heavily 
Republican states, thus confirming Hypothesis 5. The small difference of mean between 
adopters and non-adopters and its high p-value lead to no confident conclusions regarding 
Hypothesis 6. 	





GSP per capita 55180.91 50776.43 -1.5 0.13 
Personal income per 
capita 
51465.55 47263.21 -1.66 *0.09 
Citizen ideology 61.38 49.08 -2.54 *0.01 
Government ideology 51.78 38.96 -2.46 *0.01 
Ranney index 0.54 0.44 -1.88 *0.06 
Neighbors 0.55 0.37 -0.85 0.4 
     
   *p-value< 0.1  
	
Finally, Table 4 displays results from the decriminalized category. The financial 
variables are excluded from this test because inflation adjusted data are not available from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the entire period that marijuana has been 
decriminalized (starting in 1973). Results here are on par with results from the other two 
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categories, with higher citizen and government ideology scores among adopters compared to 
non-adopters. The differences are less stark than in the recreational category, but are sizable, 
nonetheless. More liberal states seem to be much more likely to adopt decriminalization, 
confirming Hypotheses 3 and 4. The Ranney Index variable again reaches significance (p-
value= 0.08) and shows adopting states to be, on average, about 0.06 more Democratic than 
non-adopters, confirming Hypothesis 5. Oddly enough, the neighbors variable reports 
different results in the decriminalization category, showing that non-adopters have more 
surrounding states with decriminalization than adopters. However, with a high p-value of 
0.29, it is difficult to make any assumptions on this, leaving Hypothesis 6 unanswered in this 
test.	





Citizen ideology 55.13 47.46 -2.37 *0.02 
Government ideology 56.11 48.35 -2.66 **0.008 
Ranney index 0.6 0.54 -1.75 *0.08 
Neighbors 0.84 1.02 1.06 0.29 
     
   *p-value< 0.1  
   **p-value< 0.01  
	
No doubt that difference of means tests are a surface level statistical tool, but these 
results provide some useful preliminary information on the likelihood of marijuana policy 
adoption. It appears from these tests that a state’s fiscal situation affects marijuana policy 
adoption in a different way than I had originally hypothesized, though it is consistent with 
other studies that find wealthier states more likely to adopt policies (Walker 1969). My basis 
for formulating Hypotheses 1 and 2 rests on the assumption that states would look to 
adopting marijuana policy to stimulate a lagging economy, but these mean comparisons 
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indicate that states that have adopted pro-marijuana policies are financially better off than 
states without adoption. My hypotheses (Hypotheses 3 and 4) on ideological and partisan 
characteristics of adopting states were confirmed in each of these mean comparisons, 
suggesting that more liberal and more Democratic states are likely to adopt pro-marijuana 
policy. The differences are largest in the recreational category, which could indicate that only 
the most Democratic and liberal states make the jump to full-on recreational legalization. The 
neighbors variable did not provide much meaningful information in these tests, only reaching 
significance in one category. To be thorough in my analysis, more complex statistical 


















  With my data organized as an Event History Analysis, I can apply a variety of 
techniques to test the effect of my independent variables on the three marijuana policy 
categories. The estimation technique I use here is a Cox Proportional Hazards Model (Cox 
1972), which seems to best fit the type of data and length of time that I seek to analyze. This 
technique attempts to explain how the risk of adoption (the dependent variable) changes with 
a one unit increase in each independent variable. The hazard ratio displayed in the first 
column is how the Cox model reports the relationship between an independent variable and 
risk of adoption, with values above one demonstrating an increase in likelihood of adoption 
and values below one demonstrating a decrease in likelihood of adoption. Since each variable 
is measured differently, the hazard ratios for each variable will need to be interpreted 
differently. For the financial variables (GSP and personal income), the unit of measurement 
is in dollars; therefore, a hazard ratio above one would indicate how much the risk of 
adoption increases with each dollar. The two ideology variables are measured by a scoring 
system, so the hazard ratio will reflect adoption likelihood in relation to a one-point increase 
in a state’s ideology score. The Ranney Index variable is measured from 0 to 1, making the 
unit of analysis a tenth of a decimal place (meaning that the hazard ratio indicates the 
likelihood of adoption with each 0.1 increase in the Ranney Index). The neighbors variable 
will reflect adoption likelihood in relation to an increase in one neighboring state adopter.	
 Table 5 shows the first Cox model for states with medical marijuana. The neighbors 
variable clearly affects risk of adoption more than all other variables in the model. With a 
hazard ratio of 1.51 (p-value=0.02), having neighboring states with medical marijuana 
substantially increases the likelihood of a state adopting medical marijuana. An increase in 
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just one state adopting a medical program leads to a 50% increase in likelihood of adoption 
for surrounding states.	
Financial variables appear to work in opposite directions, with GSP per capita 
displaying a value slightly above one and personal income per capita slightly below one. 
Though the difference is small, both variables reach statistical significance, indicating that an 
increase in a state’s GSP per capita increases the risk of adoption, while an increase in a 
state’s personal income per capita will decrease the risk of adoption.	
 Both ideology variables also seem to affect risk of adoption, and since the unit of 
measurement has a smaller scale in this variable (0-100), the hazard ratios are larger and a bit 
more meaningful. A more liberal government increases risk of medical marijuana adoption 
(by about 6% for each one-unit score increase, p-value=0.005), slightly more than a more 
liberal citizenry (4% for each one-unit score increase, p-value=0.02).	
 These findings demonstrate enough information to address my hypotheses for the 
medical category. Hypothesis 1 predicts that lower GSP per capita would increase the 
likelihood of adoption because states will need new sources of revenue. Since this 
relationship does not hold true, Hypothesis 1 has been rejected. However, Hypothesis 2, 
predicting that states with lower personal income per capita will adopt marijuana policy is 
supported for medical adoption.	
 Hypotheses 3 and 4, predicting that states with a more liberal citizenry and 
government are more likely to adopt, is also supported by the model. The Ranney Party 
Control variable does not reach statistical significance in this category, therefore I cannot 
confidently reach any conclusions regarding Hypothesis 5. Finally, the Neighbors variable 
has the largest hazard ratio in this category, indicating that the number of neighboring states 
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with medical marijuana increases the likelihood of medical adoption and confirming 
Hypothesis 6. 	
	
Table 5-Adoption of Medical Marijuana Policies in the States	
 
Hazard Ratio Standard 
Error 
z-value p-value 
GSP Per Capita 1.000078 0.0000311 2.52 *0.01 
Personal Income Per 
Capita 
0.9997985 0.0000499 -4.04 **0.001 
Citizen Ideology  1.05 0.02 2.27 *0.02 
Government Ideology 1.06 0.02 2.8 **0.005 
Ranney Party Control 1.15 2.62 0.06 0.95 
Neighbors 1.51 0.26 2.34 *0.02      
  
Log Likelihood= -156.46 LR chi2= 53.12    
chi2 p-value <.0000     
   
* p-value< 0.1    
** p-value< 0.01    
Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model 
	
As noted, only 11 states have adopted recreational marijuana policies as of 2020.  
While there are a relatively low number of states in the recreational category, three of the 
independent variables reach statistical significance (Table 6). One thing that stands out in this 
category is the divergence between the financial variables. GSP per capita displays a hazard 
ratio slightly above one (hazard ratio= 1.000083, p-value= 0.01) indicating that it increases 
the risk of adoption, and personal income per capita displays a hazard ratio slightly below 
one (hazard ratio= 0.9998451, p-value= 0.03), suggesting it decreases the risk of adoption.	
 The ideology variables indicate that an increase in ideology score (a more liberal 
score) increases the likelihood of recreational adoption, though statistical significance is only 
reached in the government ideology variable (hazard ratio= 1.08, p-value= 0.06). The 
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Ranney Index provides a hazard ratio that indicates a decrease in the likelihood of adoption 
as the index approaches 1 (more Democratic), but its high p-value suggests I cannot be 
confident in the results (p-value= 0.26). Finally, while the neighbors variable appears to be a 
powerful predictor of adoption in the medical model, it does not reach significance in the 
recreational model, and cannot be used to draw conclusions about its effect.	
 In the recreational category, only three of my hypotheses are supported or rejected. 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected, as higher GSP per capita increases the likelihood of recreational 
adoption, while Hypothesis 2 is supported, as an increase in personal income per capita 
decreases the risk of recreational adoption. A higher ideology score increases the risk of 
recreational adoption, but only at the government level. The citizen ideology variable does 
not reach statistical significance; therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported, but there is not enough 
data to support or reject Hypothesis 3. The lack of statistical significance in the Ranney Index 






















GSP Per Capita 1.000083 0.0000496 1.67 *0.01 
Personal Income Per 
Capita 
0.9998451 0.0000698 -2.22 *0.03 
Citizen Ideology  1.04 0.04 1.03 0.31 
Government Ideology 1.08 0.04 1.87 *0.06 
Ranney Party Control 0.03 0.08 -1.13 0.26 
Neighbors 1.53 0.71 0.92 0.36      
 
Log Likelihood= -51.69765 LR chi2= 13.57    
chi2 p-value< 0.01     
   
* p-value< 0.1    
Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model 
	
 Table 7 displays the last full model in my analysis for the decriminalization category. 
Due to a lack of inflation adjusted data from the BEA for the length of time needed in the 
decriminalization model, I have not included the financial variables here. Among the two 
ideology variables, an interesting development occurs in my decriminalization model.  
Government ideology achieves statistical significance, and its high hazard ratio indicates that 
a more liberal government will greatly increase the risk of adoption, more so than in the 
medical or recreational categories (hazard ratio=1.10, p-value= 0.001). Citizen ideology does 
not reach significance in this model.	
 The party control variable again shows that greater Democratic control lowers the 
likelihood of decriminalization, but the p-value is too high to confidently assert that 
conclusion (hazard ratio= 0.08, p-value= 0.2). Interestingly enough, the decriminalization 
model shows the Neighbors variable flipping and returning a hazard ratio significantly below 
one (hazard ratio= 0.60, p-value= 0.05). This result implies that an increase in surrounding 
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states with decriminalization actually decreases the risk of neighboring states doing the 
same, potentially confirming the reverse diffusion effect found by Li (2017).	
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 are neither confirmed nor rejected in the decriminalization 
category, as the financial data are not available. The reversal of the citizen ideology hazard 
ratio could imply rejecting Hypothesis 3 for the decriminalization category, but the lack of 
statistical significance prevents me from confirming or rejecting this hypothesis. I can, 
however, confirm Hypothesis 4, as the high hazard ratio and low p-value clearly 
demonstrates that a more liberal state will be at higher risk of decriminalization. Once again, 
the Ranney Index variable does not reach statistical significance, and Hypothesis 5 is neither 
rejected nor confirmed. Finally, Hypothesis 6 is rejected in the decriminalization model. The 
result seems to suggest that neighboring states with decriminalization lower the risk of 
adoption.	
	
Table 7- Decriminalization of Marijuana in the States	
 
Hazard Ratio Standard Error z-value p-value 
Citizen Ideology  0.99 0.02 -0.45 0.65 
Government Ideology 1.10 0.03 3.24 **0.001 
Ranney Party Control 0.08 0.16 -1.3 0.2 
Neighbors 0.60 0.15 -2.00 *0.05      
 
Log Likelihood= -128.31949 LR chi2=32.44    
chi2 p-value<0.001     
   
* p-value< 0.1    
** p-value< 0.01    





One final note on these models should be addressed. None of my models that include 
all independent variables lead to any meaningful conclusions regarding the relationship 
between party control and risk of marijuana policy adoption. However, removing the 
government ideology variable from the model yields a hazard ratio in the right direction and 
a significant p-value for the medical and decriminalization categories, as shown in Table 8. 	
 An issue of collinearity between government ideology and party control could be the 
reason behind these changes (Spearman’s rho= 0.8, p-value< 0.0000). Since the 1970s, the 
ideology of a state government has generally coincided with the partisan control of the state 
(Levendusky 2010). Removing the government ideology variable from the two models above 
eliminates the collinearity between government ideology and party control, thus providing 
substantive results for the Ranney Index variable in Table 8. The Ranney Index in the 
medical category reaches a very high 95.77 hazard ratio (p-value= 0.05), suggesting that an 
increase in Democrat control greatly increases the risk of adopting a medical marijuana 
program.  
The decriminalization category has similar results when the government ideology 
variable is removed. The Ranney Index hazard ratio increases to 9.92 (p-value= 0.02), 
demonstrating that more Democratic control also increases the risk of decriminalizing 
marijuana. These results lend support for Hypothesis 5 in the medical and decriminalization 












Table 8- Revised Estimations of Marijuana Adoption 
 
Medical Recreational Decriminalization 
GSP Per Capita 1.000083** (0.00003) 1.000102* 
(0.00005) 
N/A 
Personal Income Per 
Capita 
0.999803** (0.00005) 0.9998469* 
(0.00007) 
N/A 
Citizen Ideology  1.05* (0.02) 1.06* (0.04) 1.01 (0.02) 
Ranney Party Control 95.77** (166.49) 0.69 (1.92) 9.92* (12.88) 
Neighbors 1.43* (0.26) 1.30 (0.57) 0.57* (0.14)     
 
Hazard ratio (standard error) * p-value< 0.01 Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model 
excluding 
government ideology    

















 There are a few conclusions that warrant discussion across all three categories of 
marijuana policy. The inverse relationship between GSP per capita and personal income per 
capita are the same through each model (where available), with higher GSP per capita 
increasing the likelihood of adoption and higher personal income per capita decreasing the 
likelihood of adoption. This is likely caused by the different things that each variable 
captures. Gross state product isolates the health of the overall state economy at each point in 
time, while personal income isolates an individual’s experience in the state’s economy. The 
GSP variable measures value added from industry, investments, and wages combined in each 
state (Platt and Mead 2017) that may not coincide with, or even run counter to, personal 
income alone. In other words, a state may have a booming economy with relatively low 
wages compared to other states at the same time. 	
My hypotheses on both financial variables were developed with the notion that states 
in need of revenue will turn to marijuana policy adoption as they did in Berry and Berry’s 
analysis of state lotteries (1990) and sales taxes (1992). However, using the same variables, I 
have achieved different results. The models above indicate that increasing GSP per capita 
puts a state at higher risk for adoption and are presumably not looking to marijuana to spur 
their economy. Instead, states doing well economically are more likely to adopt marijuana 
policies. Perhaps marijuana legalization is seen as a secondary issue to many states, to be 
considered only when more crucial factors (like industry success and unemployment) are not 
significant issues. States could also view marijuana as an issue of individual freedom rather 
than an issue of generating revenue, making a state’s financial situation less relevant when 
considering adoption. This would differentiate my analysis from others that analyzed similar 
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policy areas like state lotteries and sales taxes (Berry and Berry 1990, 1992), and explain 
why Hypothesis 1 is rejected in all models where it is tested. 
The personal income per capita variable seems to capture what I had intended in 
Hypothesis 2. States with lower personal income are more likely to adopt marijuana 
legalization in both the medical and recreational categories, signaling that it could be 
individual experience within the economy, rather than the economy itself, that spurs a state to 
adopt. This conclusion echoes the findings in Berry and Berry’s (1990) lottery study and 
lends credence to the idea that state governments may turn to marijuana if it thinks individual 
citizens are not doing well financially.	
The ideology variables are a bit more straightforward, as all but one model confirms 
that more liberal states are at higher risk for marijuana policy adoption (my basis for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4). This squares with conventional thinking and previous analysis done by 
Walker (1969). While Walker probably didn’t anticipate marijuana legalization, he correctly 
shows how states with more resources, more professional legislatures, and higher urban 
populations are more likely to innovate and adopt new policies. I am confident that including 
these variables in my models would yield similar hazard ratios to those achieved in the 
ideology variables above. The states with Walker’s characteristics (wealthier, more urban, 
etc.) are also states with more liberal ideology scores. Therefore, it stands to reason that 
liberal states are more likely to adopt, and this is confirmed in my analysis.	
The effect of the Ranney Index measuring party control was a bit more difficult to 
uncover. Due to the collinearity of the Ranney Index and the government ideology scores, 
party control initially seemed to have a reverse and insignificant effect on marijuana 
adoption. However, once the government ideology variable was removed from the model, 
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two of the three (medical and decriminalization) categories displayed a hazard ratio 
indicating that greater Democratic control of a state significantly increases the risk of 
adoption (Table 8). This makes perfect sense given that Democrat party control and a liberal 
state government are generally synonymous today. This variable also gets at Walker’s (1969) 
idea of professional, wealthy, and urban states being more likely to adopt newer policies as 
those types of states tend to be controlled by Democrats rather than Republicans.	
The neighbors variable fell mostly in line with Hypothesis 6, predicting that a state 
would be more likely to adopt if surrounding states also adopted. This effect was observed in 
the medical and recreational models (Tables 2 and 3) but reversed in the decriminalization 
model, showing that a state’s risk of decriminalization decreases with each surrounding state 
that adopts decriminalization. It is not totally clear why the effect was reversed for this 
category, but it is not the first time reverse diffusion has been observed. Li’s (2017) 
explanation for reverse policy diffusion in performance-based education funding centers on 
the idea that states may wait to see how policies work out in surrounding states before 
adopting themselves. It could be that states skeptical of decriminalization are watching 
statistics from surrounding states regarding decriminalization, such as property crime, 
marijuana use among teenagers, or education performance, before they decide to 
decriminalize themselves. One example that stands out when looking at a map of 
decriminalization is Idaho, which is surrounded by three decriminalized states, yet has not 








 In this analysis, a few key findings have been established: (1) States do not look to 
medical or recreational marijuana as a way to boost their overall economy (rejection of 
Hypothesis 1); (2) States are more likely to adopt medical or recreational marijuana when 
average personal income is low (confirmation of Hypothesis 2); (3) More liberal and more 
Democratic states are more likely to adopt any of the three marijuana policies analyzed here 
(confirmation of Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5); And (4) states diffuse medical and recreational 
marijuana to surrounding states, though I observe a reverse relationship when it comes to 
decriminalization (partially confirming Hypothesis 6).	
 The models and analysis that I have presented here add to the sparse but growing 
literature on state marijuana policy that has thus far primarily analyzed implementation and 
consequences of marijuana policy (Aydelotte et al. 2019, Dragone et al. 2019). The few 
analyses that have focused on marijuana policy diffusion have focused on the influence of 
outside actors such as advocacy groups and evangelicals (Hannah and Mallinson 2018). My 
results coincide with findings in one of the only other time series analyses of state marijuana 
policy (Bradford and Bradford 2017), though their analysis showed that increasing personal 
income increased likelihood for adoption, whereas my analysis shows the opposite. This 
could be due to different methodology or a different time series used. Further study must be 
done on this issue to determine the best way to capture personal income and its relationship 
to the overall health of a state’s economy.	
 In many ways, the Cox models presented here confirm what we intuitively knew all 
along: pro-marijuana policies are generally adopted by states in a more liberal political 
climate with a higher degree of Democratic control. While it may be nice to anecdotally 
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speak about marijuana laws in typical liberal strongholds like Washington or California, 
these anecdotes do not speak to the factual nature of state marijuana laws as they may have 
15 years ago. Over half the country has legalized medical marijuana and more states are 
legalizing with every election cycle. While Democratic and liberal states did lead the charge 
on marijuana legalization, the pool of states left to legalize today are less liberal and more 
diverse, so quantitative techniques are necessary to tease out the underlying causes of 
adoption. Additionally, my analysis confirms what Bradford and Bradford (2017) found 
regarding the regional diffusion of medical marijuana policy, and I add that this regional 
diffusion is also observed in the spread of recreational marijuana. 	
However, my findings on the relationship between financial conditions of a state and 
its likelihood to adopt pro-marijuana policies are not as intuitive. These internal financial 
determinants are much more difficult to isolate and observe than others in my analysis. The 
fact that increasing GSP per capita increases the risk of adoption and increasing personal 
income per capita decreases the risk of adoption seems to be a bit of a conundrum. I have 
offered some potential explanations in the discussion section, but in general, it seems that the 
variables I used in this analysis do not reflect a state’s need for revenue as much as I had 
anticipated (explaining why I reject Hypothesis 1). Future analyses on marijuana diffusion 
should examine other financial variables such as a state’s unemployment rate or the level of 
deficit/surplus in a state’s budget.	
 Going forward, there are four areas of analysis that would improve on my findings 
here. First, I believe isolating each category of states and focusing on one will be more 
beneficial than analyzing all three categories as I have here. My findings have uncovered 
some basic, yet important findings regarding marijuana policy diffusion. The baseline that I 
 
 46 
have established can be built on for each category. For instance, another author could isolate 
the decriminalization category, and add many variables not included here such as public 
opinion and influence of policy entrepreneurs. Marijuana policy is heavily influenced by the 
presence of outside actors, and capturing the effect that these actors have on marijuana policy 
will be crucial to understanding diffusion more broadly. At the outset of this project, I 
attempted to account for this, but obtaining useful time series data proved to be difficult. 
Translating public opinion into a quantifiable variable for this type of analysis requires 
disaggregating national level data on marijuana opinion from the ANES or some other 
consistent survey source. Likewise, coming up with a consistent measurement of outside 
actor influence on public opinion was a challenge. In my models, I use citizen ideology 
scores developed by Berry et al. (1998) to capture public opinion. While this is an acceptable 
substitute, using state level public opinion data and an accurate measure of outside influence 
will be most beneficial for future marijuana diffusion analyses.  
 An area that I have also not addressed here is the influence of direct democracy on 
marijuana adoption. Except for Vermont and Illinois, all recreational marijuana adoptions 
have been accomplished via ballot initiative (ballotpedia.org), and findings are similar in the 
medical category. Political science scholarship has noted that the use of the ballot initiative 
increases with party competition, and the focus is primarily on wedge issues that either build 
support for your own base or force the other side to take an uncomfortable position 
(Leemann 2015). Many historically controversial issues like marijuana legalization, same-sex 
marriage, and the death penalty have been decided by some form of direct democracy, and 




Practically speaking, future scholars could easily incorporate the effect of direct 
democracy into this analysis by creating a series of dummy variables for each form of direct 
democracy. For instance, Nevada legalizes recreational marijuana in 2016 via ballot initiative 
and receives a 1 for the initiative dummy variable, and a 0 for referendum and legislation 
variables. Further digging could be done by examining types of ballot initiatives used in 
legalizing marijuana. Constitutional amendment initiatives have found success with keeping 
the status quo rather than changing a law (Haider-Markel 2001), and legislative referral 
initiatives or indirect initiatives may not necessarily reflect the true will of those who voted 
on them, which appears to be the case in the very complicated history of marijuana in Alaska. 
One other area of study not present in this analysis is the scope of marijuana policy. I 
mentioned earlier that there are many ways states have decriminalized marijuana, with some 
decriminalizing possession of less than a few grams, and others decriminalizing possession 
up to a pound. Isolating one category of marijuana policy could allow for the study of the 
depth of decriminalization, or the depth of a state’s medical or recreational programs. Kim, 
Hwang, and Berry’s (2018) creation of an index of medical marijuana depth is a great 
addition to this line of study, and a similar index could be developed for decriminalization 
and recreational categories as well. 
Finally, the relationship between marijuana policy and criminal justice should be 
further explored in the marijuana diffusion literature. I have taken a more financial and 
ideological research path in this thesis, but the glaring disparity in how marijuana law has 
been enforced cannot be ignored. Since 2010, African Americans have been around 3.5 times 
more likely to be arrested for possession of marijuana compared to while folks, showing a 
significant difference in how police patrol for marijuana possession and how state judicial 
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systems handle marijuana related charges (ACLU 2020). I mentioned earlier that a brief, but 
rapid diffusion of decriminalization policy occurred in the 1970s, and one of my theories 
behind this stems from the Schafer report essentially proving that the federal government had 
overblown the dangers of marijuana. Since a series of mandatory minimum sentence laws for 
drugs had recently been implemented around the time the Schafer report was released, it is 
possible that states decriminalizing marijuana in the 1970s did so in response to the racially 
biased policies set by mandatory minimum sentencing. Extending that logic further, states 
could be looking at the unequal enforcement of marijuana law in their state as a reason for 
altering the policy entirely, whether that means creating a medical marijuana program or full 
recreational legalization. Future scholars of marijuana diffusion will need to incorporate this 
aspect of criminal justice to paint the full diffusion picture. 	
 More broadly, this type of diffusion analysis may soon be needed to study other types 
of drugs. In November of 2020, Oregon became the first state to decriminalize all narcotics 
and legalize psilocybin therapy, a psychedelic used to treat depression (Oregon Measure 110, 
2020). Other states have indicated their interest in adopting similar measures, necessitating 
the study of drug law diffusion overall, rather than just marijuana. Scholars may soon find 
that marijuana policies diffuse differently than psilocybin policies, which diffuse differently 
than heroin policies, and so on. As more drug laws are liberalized, there will be no shortage 
of diffusion studies for political scientists. I believe that drug policy diffusion will garner an 
increasingly large portion of policy journals throughout the academic world, and my analysis 
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The fiscal health of the state (gsppercapitai, t-1): Gross State Product per capita measured in 
2012 chained dollars, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. State population 
taken from the Census Bureau’s 2018 midyear estimates made available in December of 
2018. This variable starts in 1995 and ends in 2018. To prevent Stata from dropping 2019 
and 2020 from the models, the data from 2018 was repeated for the last two years.	
	
The fiscal health of the citizens (personalincomepercapitai, t-1): Average personal income per 
capita by state measured in 2012 chained dollars, as reported by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. State population was taken from the Census Bureau’s 2018 midyear estimates 
made available in December of 2018. This variable starts in 1995 and ends in 2018, when the 
last data points are available. To prevent Stata from dropping 2019 and 2020 from the 




Citizen Ideology Scores (citizenideologyscoresi, t-1)- A score ranging from 0 (conservative) to 
100 (liberal) that measures the overall ideology of the citizenry in a state. The full list of 
inputs that make up each score can be found in Berry et al. (1998). Data ranges from 1972 to 
2016 and can be found at https://rcfording.com/state-ideology-data/. To prevent Stata from 





Government Ideology Scores (governmentideologyscores i, t-1)- A score ranging from 0 
(conservative) to 100 (liberal) that measures the overall ideology of the government in a 
state. The full list of inputs that make up each score can be found in Berry et al. (2010). Data 
ranges from 1973 to 2017 and can be found at https://rcfording.com/state-ideology-data/. To 
prevent Stata from dropping 2018-2020 from the models, the data from 2017 was repeated 
for the last three years.	
	
Party Variable	
Ranney Party Control Index (ranneyindexi, t-1)- This index measures the overall partisan climate 
of a state using a variety of factors such as state legislature control, Congressional delegation, 
governorship, etc. The index ranges from 0 (Republican) to 1 (Democrat) and the data ranges 
from 1972 to 2010, which is the last year the dataset was updated. Nebraska has had a non-
partisan legislature since 1934, therefore it is omitted from this variable (Comer 1980). A full 
list of index inputs as well as the full dataset can be found at Klarner (2013). To prevent Stata 
from dropping 2011-2020 from the models, I calculated the percentage of Democrat control 
of each state’s lower chamber to fill the last 10 years (Klarner 2018). While this is not as 




Presence of neighboring states with a marijuana policy (neighborsi, t-1): This data is reported by 







Illegal- AL, ID, KS, SC, SD, TN, WI, WY	
Decriminalized- AK, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IL, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, 
NH, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, VT, VA, WA.	
	
Medical- AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, HI, IL, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, 
NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, UT, VT, WA, WV.	
	




Table 9- Medical Category Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
gsppercapita 46285.54 45241 9129.92 25912 78075 
personalincomepercapita 34858.78 33802.5 9558.76 17488 64917 
citizenideology 46.9 45.76 14.55 8.45 95.97 
governmentideology 42.29 43.4 15.22 0.51 73.62 
ranneyindex 0.46 0.46 0.16 0.13 0.84 
neighbors 0.7 0 1.11 0 5 
	
	
Table 10- Recreational Category Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
gsppercapita 50883.86 49840 9607.88 33147 78957 
personalincomepercapita 47365.71 46117 8320.68 32163 77289 
citizenideology 49.38 47.35 15.94 13.48 97 
governmentideology 39.27 32.99 17.19 17.51 73.49 
ranneyindex 0.44 0.4 0.18 0.13 0.92 







Table 11- Decriminalization Category Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
citizenideology 47.55 46.28 16.12 5.86 95.97 
governmentideology 48.45 50.03 14.5 17.51 73.13 
ranneyindex 0.54 0.53 0.19 0.13 0.99 
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